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Abstract 
Indicators have become an important tool for policy actors at the 
bilateral and multilateral level over the past twenty years; however, they 
have mainly been developed in relation to development and public 
health goals. This note identifies the practical and methodological 
challenges in developing global (i.e. cross-national) indicators for 
transitional justice, through reflection on a practical engagement with 
UN Women, for which the author developed two indicators on 
women’s participation in truth commissions and in reparations 
programs. Specific challenges to developing the indicators included: 
the lack of administrative data on transitional justice; difficulty in 
establishing agreed definitions on “what” is being measured, which is 
linked to the lack of common agreement on the objectives of 
transitional justice initiatives; lack of standardization of data collection 
practices across countries; lack of engagement between transitional 
justice institutions’ staff and statisticians; and the general challenges in 
measuring progress against human rights objectives. I introduce a 
“basket” approach as an imperfect solution to this data reality. The 
                                                 
1 I thank the following people for their substantive input on the ideas in this essay: 
Nahla Valji, Alison Davidian, Sara Duarto Velero, Ruben Carranza, Cristián Correa, 
Elena Naughton, Peter van der Auweraert, and Sofia Macher. The approach 
described in the essay is, however, my own. 
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note concludes by identifying specific changes that would ease the 
process of developing meaningful cross-national indicators on 
transitional justice. 
 
Introduction 
Over the past several decades, development policy actors in the World 
Bank and the United Nations have led the way in creating indicators 
that permit cross-national comparisons of countries’ performance 
across a variety of development-related dimensions.2 These indicators 
rely largely on administrative and statistical data produced by states 
themselves, often through their national statistical bodies. Human 
rights policy actors have lagged behind, owing both to a lack of similar 
data and, relatedly, lack of international consensus on “what” should 
be measured.3  
Like the broader human rights field, the TJ field lacks both data 
and agreement on “what” should be measured in cross-national 
indicators for policy actors. In this “note from the field,” I will discuss 
one novel attempt to develop global, cross-national indicators related 
to TJ. I define “indicators” as signals of change, usually quantitatively 
expressed. 4  Such indicators are different from the data sets that 
                                                 
2 See, for example, the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development 
Reports and the Millennium Development Goals; as well as the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. 
3 Unlike in the development field, statistics can be difficult to come by, as states often 
cannot be trusted to gather accurate data on their own human rights records. While 
data from independent agencies or organizations may appear to fill this gap, these 
data may not adhere to a recognized, agreed set of standards and methods; moreover, 
states may criticize these agencies (fairly or not) for lack of impartiality. Finally, 
human rights remain a deeply contested issue for many states, some of which may 
wish to prioritize economic and social rights over civil and political rights. 
4  A more technical definition: “An indicator is a collection of named, rank-ordered, 
simplified and processed data that purports to represent the past or projected performance of different 
units. An indicator simplifies and processes data about a named social phenomenon 
in a way that makes it possible to compare and evaluate units such as countries, 
communities, organizations, or individuals” (italics in original). Kevin E. Davis and 
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scholars have been producing over the last half-decade or so, in that 
their intent is to capture countries’ commitments to and performance 
on TJ.  
In 2013, I worked with UN Women to develop two global 
indicators on TJ, as part of a larger framework designed to monitor the 
implementation of the Security Council’s landmark Resolution 1325 
on women, peace, and security (SCR 1325).5 As this note will show, 
there are significant obstacles to developing such indicators, and all of 
them are important lessons that can help inform the practice of both 
national and international actors working on TJ—not just international 
policy actors like UN Women staff. First, little data is produced on TJ 
initiatives (by TJ actors, states, multilateral actors, etc.), and what data 
there is may not be accessible to outside parties. Second, whatever data 
currently exists may not be particularly relevant to the decision making 
needs of a range of actors, including the global policy actors in UN 
agencies like UN Women. Third, there is no agreement internationally 
on what should be measured; even at the national level, there is little 
to no discussion of this issue. Finally, there is a need to develop 
indicators across a range of dimensions—just like development actors 
currently do—in order to make judgments whether TJ initiatives are 
performing well or poorly. In the case I discuss in this essay, I 
proposed a “basket” of several indicators, rather than a single 
indicator. While the basket approach is not perfect, it is more relevant 
and useful than a single indicator; this approach has the advantage of 
capturing five different dimensions of a reparations performance 
regarding the effective inclusion of women and girls.  
To explore how these lessons were arrived at, this note will 
start with some background to the indicators project, including the 
reason why UN Women felt it needed the proposed indicators. It will 
                                                 
Benedict Kingsbury, Indicators as Interventions: Pitfalls and Prospects in Supporting 
Development Initiatives (New York, NY: Rockefeller Foundation, 2011): ii. 
5  Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000); available from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/ 
N0072018.pdf?OpenElement. 
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then move to a discussion of my approach to measuring the indicators, 
including a description of the normative basis on which the indicator 
was based. This normative element is important because it shows the 
range of dimensions that any indicator of TJ might need to capture. 
Next, I turn to the challenges with both the conceptual relevance and 
measurement of the proposed indicators. The challenges suggest that 
the need for an alternative approach—the basket approach—which I 
then describe in detail. The essay concludes with some reflections and 
lessons learned. 
 
Background 
SCR 1325, adopted in 2000, was intended to increase the participation 
of women and incorporate a gender lens into all of the UN’s peace and 
security efforts. It has been an important tool for actors both inside 
and outside of the UN to promote inclusion of women and girls—but 
the question remains, how effective has that tool been, and what, if 
anything, is changing as a result? These are the questions that 
motivated the UN, on the tenth anniversary of SCR 1325, to develop 
a strategic framework and an inter-agency task force to monitor SCR 
1325 on a forward-going basis.6 Of the many indicators developed for 
the strategic framework, I worked on the only two that directly 
reference TJ initiatives: 
 
· Indicator 25: Extent to which Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions include provisions to address the rights and 
participation of women and girls 
·  Indicator 26a: Percentage of benefits from reparations 
programmes received by women and girls 
 
                                                 
6 See UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security, 2011–2020; 
available from http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/ 
Strategic_Framework_2011-2020.pdf. 
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I was asked to develop a methodology to measure each of 
these, working closely with the lead agency, UN Women.7 The end 
result was a nearly 20,000-word paper, as well as two “tools” that UN 
staff could use to put the indicators into practice. The hope was that 
data could be generated in advance of the next report of the Secretary-
General on Women, Peace and Security in 2014.8 
In the end, however, it is unclear whether the data for the 
indicators have actually been developed (although it is said that the 
paper has spurred useful dialogue on how to approach the issues 
within the UN). The reasons for this tenuous outcome should be 
understood in light of the conceptual and practical difficulties I faced 
in collaboration with my UN Women colleagues in this unexpectedly 
ambitious task. 
Conceptual Relevance: Why this Indicator? 
In this note from the field, I will focus on Indicator 26a, “Percentage 
of benefits from reparations programmes received by women and 
girls.”9  
                                                 
7 Specifically, I was asked to present a proposal for operationalizing both indicators, 
including (i) refinement of the parameters of each indicator and what they should 
measure, (ii) methodologies for data collection against these defined indicators, (iii) 
countries where the indicators should be implemented, and (iv) recommendations 
for future refinement/revision of both indicators under broader UN policy 
processes. 
8  For reference to the indicators developed in this paper, see “Report of the 
Secretary-General on women, peace and security” (S/2014/693), 25; available from 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_693.pdf. 
9 Because this indicator asks for a proportion of benefits, it has a clear quantitative 
element for which—on the face of it—it might seem easy to develop a methodology. 
By contrast, the other indicator on asks to assess “the extent” to which truth 
commissions include provisions to include women and girls. For this indicator, I 
developed a scorecard approach that would allow an independent scorer (i.e., UN 
staff member) to rate various aspects of a truth commission’s design and 
implementation across a range of criteria cited as important in key documents on 
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The motivation for gathering data on this issue stemmed from 
the recognition that reparations programs have not had a positive track 
record in ensuring that women and girls benefit from their initiatives 
and, indeed, that many have implicitly discriminated against women.10 
Key gaps include the fact that, in many cases, sexual and gender-based 
violence (SGBV) has not been treated comprehensively as a reparable 
harm. In particular, few programs have included repair for forced 
union, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization or loss of fertility, and 
forced abortions. Even in cases where SGBV is included as a reparable 
harm, women are less likely to come forward to claim benefits, often 
owing to the cultural stigma of sexual violence.11 Moreover, socio-
economic violations such as displacement and loss of property, which 
women suffer disproportionately in times of conflict, are usually not 
included as reparable harms.  
Additionally, compensation schemes may not adequately 
assess logistical challenges for including women, for example, the fact 
that women are less likely than men to have identification, proper 
official documents/certificates, or bank accounts; for these reasons, 
money intended for them may be directed to male relatives, which can 
cause family conflict. 12  Compensation schemes sometimes also 
reproduce local inheritance customs that discriminate against women. 
                                                 
gender and TJ. This more subjective approach was appropriate for the intent and 
wording of this indicator. 
10  The examples that follow are drawn from: UN Women, “A Window of 
Opportunity: Making Transitional Justice Work for Women,” 2nd ed. (2012), 16–17, 
available from www.unwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/06B-Making-
Transitional-Justice-Work-for-Women.pdf and Rubio-Marín, What Happened to the 
Women. 
11 This was the case in South Africa. See Beth Goldblatt, “Evaluating the Gender 
Content of Reparations: Lessons from South Africa” in Ruth Rubio-Marín, ed., What 
Happened to the Women: Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations (New York: 
SSRC, 2006), 69. 
12 Other hurdles include illiteracy and linguistic barriers. For a discussion, see Rubio-
Marín, “Introduction” in What Happened to the Women, 34; and for the South African 
example, see Goldblatt, “Evaluating the Gender Content of Reparations,” 73–74. 
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Finally, reparations may overlook the indirect impact of human 
rights violations—for example, how the loss of a male family member 
can have strongly negative consequences for women and children. 
Additionally, women may not be adequately consulted on decisions 
about how to create collective reparations programs. 
Indeed, discussions with UN Women program staff revealed 
that all of these issues were important to them, and that ideally an 
indicator could be developed to capture as many of these dimensions 
as possible. This desire, although completely understandable from a 
policy standpoint, suggested that program staff actually required a 
larger set of indicators, which was not realistic given the scope of the 
project. Thus, a single statistic was not what program staff needed to 
make good judgments about country-level performance; they likely 
would have found a scorecard or index approach more useful.  
This reaction from program staff can be contrasted with that 
of the statistician from the Evaluation Unit, who strongly emphasized 
the need for a single statistic that could be framed in such a way as to 
be easily comparable across countries. One suggestion she made was 
to develop an indicator that showed spending on reparations for 
women/girls as a proportion of GDP. This approach would probably 
be useful from a development perspective, but it was not particularly 
useful from a human rights perspective. This difference in approaches 
was striking throughout the project. Indeed, I discovered that the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has 
developed its own manual on developing human rights indicators, 
which suggests that output and/or outcome indicators—rather than 
financial/budgetary indicators—are preferable in assessing the 
enjoyment of rights.13 This publication was unknown to the statistician 
from the Evaluation Unit, however, and it is unclear how widespread 
(if at all) this kind of approach is. 
                                                 
13  OHCHR, Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation 
(Geneva, 2013), 79. 
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Balancing these different perspectives—each legitimate in its 
own right—was an important part of the project. 
 
Approach 
My approach relied on document review, including key normative and 
other background documents on TJ developed primarily by the UN, 
and interviews with technical and country experts. On the basis of 
these documents and expert interviews, I clarified the underlying 
objective for each indicator, developed definitions of terms, and set 
forth criteria for assessing change over time. I then created tools and 
guidance for collecting data on each indicator, based on best practices 
and similar examples within the UN system. Finally, I reviewed these 
criteria against several case studies—relying on document review and 
interviews with experts—to assess the limitations of the proposed 
methodology and to make changes to the tools and guidance as 
needed. In the case of the reparations indicator, I tested the proposed 
methodology in the case of Peru, to see if it would realistically show 
change over time. 
Another important aspect of my approach was maintaining a 
consistent dialogue with my counterparts at UN Women. Two of these 
were program staff with expert knowledge on TJ, and one was a 
statistician working in the Evaluation Unit, with a strong background 
in development, but little familiarity with TJ.  
Finally, because the indicators were being developed for UN 
use, they had to follow norms as laid out in key UN documents. This 
was useful, in the sense that key definitions (e.g., “reparations 
program”) could just be adopted from this guidance. It was less useful, 
however, because the guidance itself is complex—and this complexity 
needed to be reflected in the indicators. Thus, although the most 
obvious form that reparations can take is cash payment, reparations 
291  Challenges in Measurement for Policy Actors 
 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.4, 2016, 283-308 
programs should offer a variety of forms of repair, according to the 
Basic Principles and Guidelines.14 These are: 
 
  
                                                 
14 UN General Assembly resolution, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right 
to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” (2005), Arts. 
19–23, available from www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/ 
RES/60/147. 
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· Compensation: for example, cash payments or pensions 
· Restitution: for example, of lost property, civic status, or 
jobs 
· Rehabilitation: for example, of health or mental well being 
· Satisfaction: for example, public apologies and full 
disclosure of the facts about state-led abuse 
· Guarantees of non-repetition: for example, reforms of 
abusive state institutions 
 
While the normative guidance recognizes that it is impossible 
to fully repair the harms of gross human rights violations, programs 
that have taken a more complex approach to their mix of benefits have 
perhaps been more successful in achieving basic TJ goals such as 
recognizing victims and fostering a sense of citizenship—for example, 
programs in Chile and Argentina that provide a mix of payments, social 
benefits, and symbolic actions like memorials and apologies. With 
respect to recognizing victims, many programs have done this 
successfully, especially through the integration of individualized 
symbolic gestures with material benefits like cash payments and 
pensions—for example, including personalized letters of apology or a 
copy of the truth commission’s report when victims are sent their 
reparations check. The need for a comprehensive and complex 
approach to reparations was integrated into the conceptualization of 
the indicator, as I demonstrate below. 
Key Challenges 
Although the indicator seems simple and straightforward, in fact it 
posed a variety of difficult challenges, most importantly with respect 
to the conceptual relevance of the indicator and the ease of actually 
measuring, or producing data, for the indicator.  
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Problems with Conceptual Relevance 
The most important challenge relates to conceptual relevance, meaning 
the indicator’s relevance to the change that it is intended to signal. In 
fact, Indicator 26a, as written, would not provide a reliable signal of 
the specific change that the UN seeks, which is the effective inclusion 
of women and girls in reparations programs. Instead, this indicator 
would show positive and negative fluctuations over time that may have 
little to do with how well a program has actually included women and 
girls.15  
For example, in Sierra Leone, women and girl victims of sexual 
violence were offered fistula surgery as part of the reparations 
program. This is something that, once completed, does not need to be 
offered again. The result, then, is that the total share of reparations 
benefits for women and girls would see a negative change after most 
women had received their fistula surgeries, even though women may 
still be well served by the reparations program as a whole. These kinds 
of positive and negative fluctuations will be seen in every reparations 
program that offers one-off benefits that are enjoyed primarily by male 
or by female beneficiaries. Ultimately, I ran a series of models to 
substantiate this conclusion—i.e., that the indicator, as constructed, 
would not necessarily change over time in a way that could easily be 
construed as a “good” or “bad” outcome in terms of the change 
desired. 
Moreover, the indicator as currently constructed would not say 
anything about changes in one of the key obstacles to women and girls’ 
inclusion that the UN has identified, which is the fact that many 
reparations programs do not include SGBV abuses as reparable harms. 
Discussions with UN Women program staff suggested that this was a 
critical signal that the indicator needed to make. However, in theory, a 
                                                 
15 Although I did not have the opportunity to address this in the paper, I would also 
add that reparations programs ought not to treat “women” and “girls” as a single 
group; there is an emerging body of research on the inclusion of children in TJ that 
discusses some of the differences. See ICTJ’s “Children and Youth” program page 
at www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/children-and-youth. 
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reparations program could see a high percentage of benefits going to 
women and girls even when SGBV abuses are not being repaired—for 
example, if benefits are given to widows of men who have been killed 
or disappeared. 
 
Problems with Measurement 
Other significant challenges relate to methodological and 
measurement issues specific to reparations programs. First, reparations 
benefits are quite different in kind, not just within countries, but also 
across countries. Although there was an expectation (mainly from the 
statistician from the Evaluation Unit) that I could create a complex 
formula to aggregate different aspects of a reparations “program,” as 
is done with other types of social programs, this is not realistic or even 
desirable. This would assume that such programs are similar across 
countries (they are not), or that they have a “program-like” quality, 
which many do not. In fact, it is not always easy to identify what counts 
as a reparations program. 16  While some countries, such as Brazil, 
Malawi, and Morocco, have established self-standing reparations 
commissions to administer benefits, other countries have not. For 
example, in Argentina, reparations have been legislated incrementally 
through discrete laws, and no particular administrative body is in 
charge of them.17 
As an in-depth example, consider Nepal’s Interim Relief 
Program (IRP), which provides benefits to families of people 
murdered or disappeared during the conflict.18 The program provides 
                                                 
16  In fact, OHCHR suggests that most countries do not have reparations 
“programs,” which it defines as “designed from the outset as a systematically 
interlinked set of reparations measures.” Instead, it observes that most countries 
have reparations “efforts” that emerge in an ad hoc, incremental way. OHCHR, 
“Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Reparations Programmes” (2008), 3, 
available from www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ 
ReparationsProgrammes.pdf. 
17 Ibid., 12. 
18 Information on Nepal’s IRP comes from Ruben Carranza, “Relief, Reparations, 
and the Root Causes of Conflict in Nepal” (ICTJ, 2012), as well as discussions with 
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a mix of benefits: one-off cash payments to the nearest relative of the 
murdered/disappeared; additional one-off cash payments specifically 
to widows/wives of the murdered/disappeared; and educational 
scholarships for up to three children paid to the nearest relative of the 
murdered/disappeared. Further, health benefits are provided to 
persons who were injured during the conflict. These benefits entail free 
medical services from government-run agencies, or reimbursement of 
health services from private doctors. 
How could all of this be combined into a single percentage? 
While it might seem straightforward to calculate the percentage of the 
one-off cash payments received by women/girls, there are some 
ambiguities. For example, in cases where children are the “nearest 
relatives,” then the payments will go to an adult who is a guardian, who 
may be a male relative. So who has actually “received” the benefits in 
this case—the male guardian or the children, including girls?19 Other 
parts of the program are also ambiguous. First, we do not know if or 
how many girls benefit from the educational scholarships, because they 
are limited to three per family, and therefore in larger families the 
benefits could be used for three boys. Moreover, most health benefits 
are provided as part of the larger national health services budget, rather 
than as a separate program—therefore, data cannot be disaggregated 
so that we know who received what services and how much they cost, 
except perhaps in the rare cases that people ask to be reimbursed for 
services from private doctors (typically, this only takes place when the 
victim is outside of Nepal and cannot access the government-run 
system). These ambiguities exist in almost every reparations program. 
                                                 
Ruben Carranza and Elena Naughton of ICTJ. See also a previous ICTJ report, 
“From Relief to Reparations: Listening to the Voices of Victims” (ICTJ, 2011). 
19 Although one could argue that all children, including girls, benefit even if a male 
custodian receives reparations payments, in South Africa, attempts were made to 
direct payments to female custodians of children, on the assumption that they were 
more likely than men to use the money to benefit the child. See Goldblatt, 
“Evaluating the Gender Content of Reparations,” 73–74. 
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A second, and perhaps more decisive, measurement challenge 
concerns the availability of administrative data. This is a general 
challenge with all TJ measures, not just reparations programs. But 
reparations present their own special difficulties. It is unrealistic to 
expect that we will see clear budget lines for each type of reparations 
benefit. In most countries, the data does not exist in a central location, 
as programs are often administered by different local and national state 
agencies. Taking the example of Nepal’s IRP once again, there is little 
accessible data on the costs for health benefits. Eligible beneficiaries 
go to their local clinics for treatment, and the costs for these benefits 
are rolled into the state’s general health budget—they are not 
disaggregated anywhere as costs “for victims.” While in theory it may 
be possible to get the data for victims who have used private medical 
services, and who thus must submit receipts for reimbursement, these 
instances are rare, and it is unknown whether data is kept on the gender 
of those who use private medical services. There is a similar problem 
with the data for educational scholarships. There simply is no data on 
how much these benefits actually support the schooling of girls, 
especially since, as mentioned, the scholarships are limited to three 
children per family, and no data is kept on which children in each 
family actually use the benefits. Finally, when there is more than one 
type of benefit, we usually have no way of knowing who or how many 
people are receiving multiple benefits, and who or how many people 
(including women/girls) are not. There is not a central ledger 
anywhere, in which benefits distributed are tracked against particular 
victims’ names. 
A Way Forward? 
Given the conceptual and measurement challenges discussed, both the 
program and evaluation staff at UN Women agreed that I should 
propose an alternative approach. 
A number of alternatives were explored, most of which were 
quantitative in nature and relied on administrative data. UN Women 
emphasized that the indicator should be easy to measure, given 
297  Challenges in Measurement for Policy Actors 
 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.4, 2016, 283-308 
available data, which placed limits on the kinds of indicators that could 
be considered. In the end, full methodologies were developed for two 
other quantitative indicators, before they were rejected. Both of these 
focused on counting beneficiaries/victims, rather than counting 
benefits received—simply because we have better data on the former 
than on the latter. 
The first proposal was: “Percentage of beneficiaries listed in a 
reparations programme’s official registry of victims who are women 
and girls.” This indicator would have relied on existing administrative 
data in the official registry of victims. While these data are usually 
readily available, this option was rejected because its conceptual 
relevance and utility to UN Women staff was unclear. There was, in 
particular, an objection to a narrow focus on potential beneficiaries 
rather than actual beneficiaries 20 —UN Women program staff 
(understandably) wanted the indicator to signal the degree to which 
women/girls had actually benefitted from such programs.  
The second was: “Percentage of actual beneficiaries of 
reparations programmes who are women and girls.” This indicator 
would have relied on administrative data from a range of ministries 
responsible for aspects of the reparations program. While this 
approach had the merit of counting “actual” rather than “potential” 
beneficiaries, the conceptual relevance and utility for UN Women staff 
was still unclear, specifically because it did not provide any signal of 
whether harms related to SGBV were being repaired or not. Also, in 
some cases, the data would not be centralized and might be difficult to 
generate. 
Other possible indicators were discussed, without the 
development of methodologies. These were also based on data that 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately, the mere act of being registered as a victim in a registry does not 
mean that a person will actually receive reparations. This has been particularly true 
in the case of women and girls, for some of the reasons mentioned above (lack of 
bank accounts, receipt by male relatives or guardians, etc.). There is also the fact that 
reparations benefits are sometimes promised and then never delivered. 
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was more readily available, for example, data on one-off payments 
rather than health benefits.  
For example, we discussed the indicator, “Ratio of the percentage 
of one-off benefits received by women/girls to one-off benefits 
received by men/boys.” This indicator would have revealed 
differences in the rate that women/girls received benefits, if there were 
such differences. However, it was considered to be too one-
dimensional. Additionally, it was said that using a ratio would be 
problematic, as it would be difficult to know whether overall changes 
were a result of changes in the numerator or the denominator. 
We also discussed, “Proportion of estimated women/girl 
victims who actually register for reparations.” This indicator would be 
useful in helping to assess the degree to which women are coming 
forward to register as victims/beneficiaries, and the ease with which 
they are recognized as victims/beneficiaries. The challenge, however, 
is that in many cases there are no existing population surveys of 
estimated victims to make the comparison against. 
 
A “Basket” Approach 
Indicators exist in order to help us measure change and to compare 
similar phenomena across countries. They also help to set policy 
priorities and to benchmark or measure performance. Human rights 
indicators, as pointed out in OHCHR’s Human Rights Indicators, should 
be anchored in the normative content of specific rights, and they 
should focus on measuring the commitments of duty bearers, primarily 
states.21 
In this case, an indicator is needed to signal changes in 
states’ commitments to the effective inclusion of women and 
girls in reparations programs. The challenge is to find an indicator 
that can capture various attributes of inclusion. 
                                                 
21  OHCHR, Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation 
(Geneva, 2013), 33. 
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Given the complexity and variety of reparations programs, 
these various attributes related to state behavior and normative change 
can be captured more easily if a “basket” of relevant indicators is 
created.22 The proposed title for this revised indicator is: Women and 
girls’ effective inclusion in reparations programmes. 
The basket itself would consist of the following indicators, 
each of which signals one aspect of gender sensitivity for each of the 
five types of reparations outlined in the Basic Principles and Guidelines. 
Each indicator should be assessed a score of “2” if it has been fulfilled, 
“1” if it has been partially fulfilled (that is, if it has begun and is still in 
progress), and a score of “0” if it has not been fulfilled at all. That is, 
the difference between a “1” and a “2” score is the difference between 
an ongoing and a completed activity. A short, one-paragraph 
description should be included to give the rationale for the score for 
each of the five indicators (see Appendix for more detail).  
 
· Compensation: The reparations programme has 
implemented cash payments and/or pensions 
specifically for widows/spouses. One key challenge in terms 
of compensation is the fact that women may be overlooked as 
“indirect” victims of human rights violations; indeed, the loss 
of a male head of household can have especially dire 
consequences for women and families. Experience has shown 
that if there is not specific language to prioritize 
widows/spouses in reparations programs’ laws or guidelines, 
then male family members of the deceased/disappeared may 
step forward to claim benefits instead of wives/widows. This 
indicator requires the use of specific language to include 
widows/spouses in laws and/or implementing guidelines for 
reparations programs. If widows/spouses are not specifically 
                                                 
22  This approach is modeled on baskets of indicators proposed in DPKO and 
OHCHR’s publication, The United Nations Rule of Law Indicators: Implementation Guide 
and Project Tools (2011), sec. 3.2; available from 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf. 
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mentioned, but only implied, then this should be given a “0” 
score, even if the cash payments in general have been partially 
or entirely completed.23 
· Restitution: A restitution programme exists, and it 
receives a score of “2a” or above according to IASC 
Gender Marker codes (i.e., the project is designed to 
contribute significantly to gender equality). During 
conflict, women and girls often suffer disproportionately from 
socio-economic violations such as displacement and loss of 
property. Many reparations programs do not, however, address 
such harms. It will therefore be important to track the 
inclusion of restitution initiatives in relation to property, civic 
status, jobs, etc., as part of reparations programs—as well as 
steps states are making to ensure the effective participation of 
women and girls in those initiatives. Gender marker codes have 
been in use by many UN agencies for many years. IASC’s 
version of these codes has a well-developed set of generic 
criteria that are readily applicable to restitution programs.24 To 
determine the proper gender marker code, the IASC criteria 
must be referenced.25 A program can be coded on a scale of 0 
to 2. A score of “0” represents “no visible potential to 
                                                 
23  Cristián Correa has noted that in Argentina’s reparations program for the 
disappeared, the “beneficiary” of the payment is the disappeared person him- or 
herself, rather than a spouse/widow and other family members. As heirs to the 
beneficiary, widows/spouses do however receive reparations payments. In this kind 
of ambiguous case, what is most important is that widow/spouses are specifically 
foreseen to benefit, even if they are not technically “beneficiaries” according to the 
law. 
24 For an overview of the codes, see Global Protection Cluster, “IASC Gender 
Marker – Frequently Asked Questions,” July 29, 2011; available from 
www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/partners/Gender_Marker_FAQ_29
July2011_EN.pdf.  
25  The document can be found on the Global Protection Cluster web site, at 
www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/partners/Gender_Marker_FAQ_29
July2011_EN.pdf. 
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contribute to gender equality.” A score of “1” represents the 
“potential to contribute in some limited way to gender 
equality.” The code of “2” is split into “2a” and “2b.” Both 
signal programs that mainstream gender into analysis and 
design. However, “2a” sets a slightly lower bar, in which 
programs must simply have the “potential to contribute to 
gender equality,” whereas programs coded as “2b” must have 
gender equality “as their primary goal.”26 In order to code the 
restitution program, all aspects of its design and 
implementation should be considered. Specific signals that the 
restitution program is designed to contribute significantly to 
gender equality can include, but are not limited to: wives, 
including common law wives, are given an equal share of the 
property being restituted to their husbands if they were married 
at the moment of the dispossession; widows or wives of the 
disappeared have immediate access to claim salaries, labor 
compensation, and property of their husbands free of fees and 
taxes; and there is an expedient method for wives of the 
disappeared to declare the absence due to the disappearance of 
their husbands and to claim inheritance or administer their 
estates.27 
· Rehabilitation: The reparations programme has 
implemented medical services specifically for victims of 
SGBV. Another key challenge with reparations programs has 
been the exclusion of SGBV as a reparable harm—especially 
for forced union, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization or loss 
of fertility, and forced abortions. In countries where most of 
the victims of human rights abuse have been male detainees, 
some states have assumed that SGBV is not relevant, even 
though we know that men routinely suffer from SGBV and 
may report it at an even lower rate than women. This indicator 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 I thank Cristián Correa for these examples. 
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will provide a signal not only of whether the need for 
rehabilitation is being addressed, but also whether or not a 
reparations program includes SGBV. In order to code this 
indicator as a “2” or a “1,” the program must include 
specialized medical services for SGBV victims. Examples of 
such services include, but are not limited to: psychosocial 
support; pre- and post-natal care for women who have become 
pregnant from rape; fistula surgery; interventions to restore 
fertility; interventions to repair damage to sexual organs; etc. 
Appropriate medical services will vary from context to context. 
The indicator should be coded as a “0” if no specialized 
medical services are offered to SGBV victims, or if only general 
health care is offered. For example, if SGBV victims are simply 
enrolled in the national health care service, then the indicator 
should be scored a “0.” 
· Satisfaction: The reparations programme has 
implemented at least one symbolic measure specifically 
targeted to women and/or girls. In countries where SGBV 
and gender discrimination is deeply entrenched, symbolic 
measures such as apologies and memorials can be important in 
signaling the state’s commitment to broader change toward 
gender justice. For example, in 2010, the President of Sierra 
Leone formally apologized to women victims of the country’s 
conflict; in Kenya, the recent report of the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission recommended a similar apology 
from the head of state, although it has not yet taken place. As 
mentioned, symbolic measures include official apologies and 
commemorations and tributes to victims, such as public 
memorials, holidays, or other officially sponsored acts. In 
order to be scored as a “2” or a “1,” the measures must be 
“specifically targeted to women/girls.” Such targeting can take 
many forms. Examples include official apologies to 
women/girls for violence they experienced during conflict and 
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commemorative days or public memorials that honor women 
victims. 
· Non-repetition: The state has adopted and implemented 
at least one legal reform intended to promote gender 
equality, stemming from the recommendations of a truth 
commission or from an official reparations policy. The 
Basic Principles and Guidelines insist that the state has a 
responsibility to take steps to prevent the recurrence of human 
rights abuse. For women and girls in many countries, legal 
reforms are necessary to guarantee rights that act as bulwarks 
against SGBV, dispossession, and poverty. Examples include 
the following reforms: property and/or matrimonial property 
laws; inheritance laws; marriage laws; laws on sexual violence; 
child protection laws; and equal opportunity laws. Such 
reforms are often included as recommendations in the final 
reports of truth commissions. In order to be scored as a “2,” 
the state must not only adopt, but also put in place adequate 
administrative and budgetary measures to implement the law. 
Cases in which a new law exists, but where the there is a lack 
of resources or administrative capacity to implemented it, 
should be scored a “1” until such time as the needed resources 
and capacity are strengthened. Cases where there have been 
legal reforms to promote gender equality, but the reforms are 
not clearly linked to a reparations process, should be scored a 
“0.”  
 
The target for the basket is 100 percent compliance with all five 
indicators.  
 
Rationale 
The new approach offers a number of advantages. The conceptual 
relevance is more clearly related to the objective, which is to assess 
states’ commitments to the effective inclusion of women. Moreover, 
the basket approach directly addresses the challenges to women’s 
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effective inclusion in reparations programs that the UN has identified, 
such as the lack of inclusion of SGBV as a reparable harm. Finally, this 
approach is tied to the five types of reparations outlined in the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines. Each indicator is designed to signal one gender-
related dimension of each type of reparations. It should be noted that 
the indicators are not intended to give a comprehensive picture of each 
of the five types of reparations, but rather provide a targeted signal that 
can be useful in assessing whether reparations programs are generally 
heading in a positive direction. 
Moreover, data collection for this indicator will be easier. The 
basket primarily consists of a series of yes/no questions about specific 
benefits that have actually been implemented. The questions can be 
clearly answered by expert observers, and confirmed independently. It 
thus avoids the many thorny issues involved with data collection and 
measurement, especially for those reparations programs that distribute 
benefits through a range of local and state agencies.  
Reflections and Lessons Learned 
The basket indicator ultimately developed for UN Women was a 
compromise solution to a very interesting puzzle: can you develop a 
single indicator that is a reliable signal of a country’s performance on 
a TJ issue? The answer, for me, is no. Although I have described a very 
particular example in this essay—an indicator on reparations for UN 
Women—many of the challenges that the example raises are generally 
applicable to the TJ field as a whole. Ultimately, only a set of indicators 
that embrace a range of dimensions of TJ would really be useful to 
policy and program actors—and indicators are supposed to be useful 
to someone. Discussions with colleagues at UN Women, the 
International Center for Transitional Justice, the International 
Organization for Migration, and elsewhere suggest a number of gaps 
that would need to be filled in order for international actors to create 
cross-national indicators of the kind that development actors currently 
use. 
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First, TJ initiatives themselves should be producing reliable, 
public administrative data—not just on budgets and expenditures, but 
also on outputs and outcomes. This is important not just for the 
creation of indicators for international actors, but perhaps even more 
so that national and local civil society groups can monitor TJ processes, 
applying pressure and advocacy when necessary. The data needs to be 
gathered so that it can be disaggregated across a range of criteria, 
including gender, ethnicity, region, and income level. 
Second (and related), TJ actors need to develop capacity on 
data production, or partner with impartial, expert agencies that can 
provide the needed technical expertise. In many countries, the national 
statistical body may be a possible source of support; moreover, 
engaging this body may open a productive dialogue on how to measure 
human rights—a field with which those with statistical training may be 
unfamiliar. Elsewhere, we have seen TJ institutions, especially truth 
commissions, partner with international NGOs with expertise in 
database creation, which can also be a useful approach. As an aside, I 
found this process with UN Women to be a positive example of 
mutual learning between the “program” and the “statistics” side of UN 
Women. Each side pushed the other to recognize legitimate needs as 
well as one’s own boundaries of expertise. On the program side, it was 
important to emphasize the limited nature and role of indicators—they 
cannot and should not tell us everything. It’s just not feasible. On the 
statistics side, I believe that there was a stronger appreciation for the 
differences between the objectives of “development” and “human 
rights” indicators. 
Third, it would be useful for data to be centralized as much as 
possible, especially since the implementation of TJ is almost always 
distributed across different governmental bodies and levels. This ideal 
is probably not achievable in most cases—except, perhaps, in countries 
like Tunisia that have set up specific ministries or agencies for dealing 
with TJ. At a minimum, it would be useful for the various agencies 
working on TJ to be in contact with one another in order to set basic 
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parameters for data development, so that similar data is being 
collected. 
Finally, the utility of indicators is that they are signals of 
change—defining “which” changes are the most important ones to 
track is critical to the development of cross-national indicators. UN 
norms provide guidance—albeit highly complicated and evolving—on 
the most important changes to seek. However, this thicket of 
documents needs to be simplified in terms of specific and measurable 
indicators upon which people can generally agree—not just donors 
and multilateral agencies, but also the countries where TJ is currently 
operating. So far, this very important task has not yet been done. UN 
Women has taken the first step, but it is not yet clear that there will be 
a second one, from UN Women or any other UN agency. It might be 
easier for policy actors to push ahead with indicator development if 
there were more readily available data to work with. It may be, 
however, that states need to be incentivized to create this data; having 
UN-created indicators that states must report on is one way to push 
countries to develop data in the first place. At a minimum, those 
countries that are receiving financial or technical assistance from the 
UN on TJ issues should be pushed to produce more, better, and 
publicly available data on their design, implementation, and outcomes. 
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Appendix 
 
Proposed scoring tool: Indicator 26a on Reparations 
 
Indicator Score  
0, 1, 2 
The reparations programme has implemented cash payments and/or pensions 
specifically for widows/spouses 
 
A restitution programme exists, and it receives a score of “2a” or above 
according to IASC Gender Marker codes (i.e., the project is designed to 
contribute significantly to gender equality) 
 
The reparations programme has implemented medical services specifically for 
victims of SGBV 
 
The reparations programme has implemented at least one symbolic measure 
specifically targeted to women and/or girls 
 
The state has adopted and implemented at least one legal reform intended to 
promote gender equality, stemming from the recommendations of a truth 
commission or from an official reparations policy 
 
TOTAL BASKET SCORE (out of 10)  
 
 
Explanation of Scoring 
 
Each indicator should be assessed a score of “2” if it has been fulfilled, 
“1” if it has been partially fulfilled (i.e., is still ongoing), and a score of 
“0” if it has not been fulfilled at all. A short, one-paragraph description 
should be included to give the rationale for the score for each of the 
five indicators. This description should include the sources of 
information for the scoring, as well as: 
 
In the case of a score of “2”: 
· What steps were taken to fulfill the indicator, including 
specific information on implementation 
· When the indicator was fulfilled 
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In the case of a score of “1”: 
· What steps have been taken so far 
· An estimate of when the indicator will be fulfilled in the 
future 
· In the case that there has been no change since the prior 
assessment of the indicator at the “1” level, an explanation 
for why there has been no change 
 
In the case of a score of “0”: 
· Why no steps have been taken to fulfill the indicator 
· In the case that there has been no change since the prior 
assessment of the indicator at the “0” level, an explanation 
for why there has been no change 
